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COMMENT
The New Florida Medical Malpractice
Legislation and Its Likely
Constitutional Challenges
I. INTRODUCTION
Because of the fundamental importance of the health care market, it
is uniquely situated alongside other crucial product and services markets
in the United States. While other markets such as foodstuffs, consumer
goods, or transportation may be considered "necessary" to maintain a
certain way of life, the driving force behind the health care market is
sustenance of life itself. When viewed as a chain of events, this market
begins and ends with the consumer. A consumer's need sets into motion
a multifarious cast of characters who assist him or her. There are hospi-
tal staffs of maintenance workers, custodial employees, nurses and doc-
tors whose primary point of contact is the consumer. There are medical,
biomedical and pharmaceutical research companies that provide innova-
tive products. There are employers in other sectors of the economy who
generate the income necessary to pay for these services.
Even with this great complexity in the health care market, however,
from a consumer perspective two characters are considered most impor-
tant: the doctor and the insurance company. In many ways, these two
work together in servicing the consumer. The doctor manages the proto-
cols necessary to meet consumer health care needs, and the insurance
company provides broad risk pools necessary to spread health care costs
and reduce the fees charged the consumers themselves. But there is also
great tension in the system. Consumers rely on the knowledge and skill
of the doctor to correctly manage the protocols, while doctors rely on
insurance companies to again spread the risk of their misjudgments.
Central in this tension is the legal process. Health care is highly
regulated because of its complexity and position as a singularly impor-
tant market. Similarly, laws dictate how physicians practice and what
level of skill and knowledge they will be required to possess. Regula-
tions dictate how insurance companies operate and spread the risks of
physicians who fall short of these requirements. Courts determine what
level of care consumers can expect to receive, and what redress consum-
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ers may seek when they are injured by a doctor's failure to meet the
mandated standards of their profession.
At present, imbalance in the system is causing lawmakers at the
state and federal level to consider alternative methods of policing the
market. Consumers are paying high health care costs, and correspond-
ing high premiums for health care insurance. Doctors are paying higher
prices for malpractice insurance, without which they are told by the reg-
ulators they cannot practice medicine. Insurance companies are paying
higher litigation costs and recouping less from investment income, forc-
ing them to raise rates for both doctors and consumers.
The health care system is maintained only through a series of com-
promises. Insurance companies (or, more properly, their regulators)
need to choose a level of profitability that does not require either patient
or provider to pay exorbitant premiums. Doctors and health care admin-
istrators need to reach a level of efficiency that at once cuts the cost of
health care without harming the quality of care provided to consumers.
Patients need to prioritize health through lifestyle choices so as to cut
their exposure to life-threatening injury, and at the same time be willing
to pay fees for health care services.
Imbalance comes from excessive profit taking or funds mismanage-
ment by insurance companies, poor quality of care by physicians, and
overwillingness by consumers to litigate undesirable results where there
is no error. The present dysfunction in the system has come from all
three sources. In addition, outside factors influence the system, and the
legislative compromises presently being mulled must properly address
all these complexities. However intricate these proposals, lawmakers
should keep in mind that health care is a necessary market. Central to
the functioning of that market is the role of the patient, the doctor, and
the insurance company.
It is in this imbalanced context that the Florida Legislature enacted
new legislation during August 2003. The new legislation attempts to
streamline the process by which medical malpractice disputes are liti-
gated. It also attempts to rationalize the exposure that doctors face when
performing procedures, and that insurers face when covering doctors. It
is designed to lower premiums paid by doctors to maintain professional
liability insurance.
This Comment will first address the history of medical malpractice
reform in Florida, briefly pointing to what measures were enacted in the
past. Understanding what occurred in the past will provide some
insight into the push to enact the new measures that culminated in Sen-
ate Bill 2-D in August 2003. The focus will then shift to the constitu-
tional standard by which the new legislation will be judged, discussing
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what similar legislation was found unconstitutional in the past, and what
challenges to the current act can reasonably be foreseen. In an effort to
meet the constitutional standard for the new legislation, certain findings
of fact were set forth in the legislation. These will be challenged based
on a statistical and logical examination of the findings of the legislature.
Finally, this Comment will examine the likely effect of the present
reforms.
It is foreseeable that the new measures will do little to curb the
present medical malpractice insurance "crisis" facing Florida. In its
haste to pass some measure of reform in a Fourth Special Session, the
legislature made too many compromises, and in effect neutralized the
effect of the Bill. The fundamental flaw with the legislation is that
insurers remain free to set malpractice insurance rates without any real
checks against the insurance practices that are arguably the best explana-
tion for what caused the present "crisis" in the first place.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM
IN FLORIDA
Capping non-economic damages awarded in medical malpractice is
not a new proposition. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Florida Legislature
passed several measures meant to discourage frivolous medical malprac-
tice claims, including a non-economic damages cap that was later deter-
mined to be unconstitutional by the Florida Supreme Court.1
In 1975, the Florida Legislature passed the Comprehensive Medical
Malpractice Reform Act,2 with the stated purposes of normalizing the
cost of medical malpractice insurance, discouraging frivolous lawsuits,
and ensuring the population of Florida would have access to health
care.3 At the time that legislation was passed, the state was undergoing
a crisis of rising medical malpractice insurance premiums similar to the
present experience. Also similar to the current situation, a legislative
Task Force was convened to examine the problems and solutions to
those problems.4
The 1975 Act enacted procedural hurdles over which a claimant in
a medical malpractice action had to jump before being able to file a
lawsuit. A claimant was required to submit the action to a mediation
1. The constitutionality of the cap on damages was challenged in Smith v. Department of
Insurance, 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987). In that case, the Florida Supreme Court found that a
$450,000 cap on non-economic damages violated the plaintiffs right of access to the courts.
2. 1975 Fla. Laws ch. 75-9, codified as FLA. STAT. ch. 769.133 (1975).
3. Id.
4. This Task Force was discussed in the University of Miami v. Echarte case, where the 3d
DCA took notice of the work of the task force, as well as its recommendations and proposed
solutions to the legislature. 585 So. 2d 293, 296 n.l I (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
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panel. before filing it with a clerk of court.5 Several other "reform" mea-
sures were passed, but most of these spoke to the amount of awards
rather than measures enacted to discourage frivolous lawsuits. The mea-
sures provided that a judge could adjust a jury award considered ineffec-
tively low or unacceptably high.6 A "Patient's Compensation Fund"
was set up to cover losses exceeding the limits of the doctors' or hospi-
tals' malpractice policies.7 Nonetheless, the only procedural barrier to
actually filing a lawsuit that was enacted at the time was the provision
for a mediation panel, and the Florida Supreme Court eventually deemed
even that unconstitutional.8
In 1985, the 1975 Act was amended, imposing some real barriers to
filing a medical malpractice claim. These provisions required a claimant
to follow a pre-suit screening procedure, including investigation into the
validity of the claims and the possibility of court-ordered arbitration of
the claims.9 Even though the arbitration determination was non-binding,
these provisions, meant to screen out frivolous claims, finally erected
real barriers to filing a medical malpractice cause of action. If the claim
was still brought after a plaintiff complied with all pre-filing require-
ments, the 1985 amendments added further protection for doctors and
hospitals in the form of a $450,000 cap on non-economic damage
awards. 10
The cap on non-economic damages did not survive constitutional
challenges. In 1987, the Florida Supreme Court declared the cap uncon-
stitutional as a violation of a claimant's right of access to the courts.1
Nevertheless, some strong measures still remain to reduce the amount of
exposure that hospitals and doctors face in medical malpractice actions.
These include a $250,000 cap on non-economic damages in voluntary
binding arbitration, which is reduced in percentage terms by the plain-
tiffs capacity to enjoy life. 12 Refusing an opponent's invitation to enter
into voluntary binding arbitration has consequences. For the plaintiff,
refusing the offer would result in capping non-economic damages at
$350,000. For the defendant, refusal results in the award of interest and
attorneys' fees if the plaintiff succeeds at trial.1 3 Therefore, as it stands
5. FLA. STAT. ch. 768.44 (1976).
6. FLA. STAT. ch. 768.49 (1976).
7. FLA. STAT. ch. 768.54 (1976).
8. See Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980).
9. FLA. STAT. ch. 768.495, 768.575 (1985).
10. FLA. STAT. ch. 766.202 (1993).
11. Smith v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987).
12. FLA. STAT. ch. 766.207 (2002). For example, a plaintiff whose capacity to enjoy life has
been diminished by 50% would be able to recover no more than $125,000 in non-economic
damages through the arbitration.
13. FLA. STAT. ch. 766.209 (1995).
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today, there are hurdles to bringing a medical malpractice claim in Flor-
ida, and consequences if the claimant decides not to submit to arbitration
of the claim.
In addition, the medical lobby has been instrumental in getting
other "tort reform" 4 measures passed in the legislature. In 1999, for
example, the legislature made significant changes to the rule of joint and
several liability of tortfeasors.1 5 These changes were heavily supported
by the Florida Medical Association, which felt that the measure would
be beneficial to those doctors and hospitals that were responsible for
only a very limited percentage of the injury to the plaintiff. 6
However, faced with the rising medical malpractice premiums in
the late 1990s, the prior reform measures were deemed insufficient by
the medical community. Doctors renewed their call for caps on damages
awarded to victims of their negligence, requesting a $250,000 cap on
non-economic damages in order to reduce the burden of malpractice pre-
miums." The medical profession largely blamed frivolous lawsuits and
''runaway jury awards" for the heavy premium increases they faced.
III. THE NEW LEGISLATION - A BRIEF OVERVIEW
On August 14, 2003, the Florida Legislature heeded the call of doc-
tors' groups and the insurance industry and passed Senate Bill 2-D,
enacting wide-ranging medical malpractice reforms.' 8 Key provisions
of the reforms included capping non-economic damages that can be
awarded in malpractice lawsuits, limiting bad faith actions that may be
brought against insurance companies, and enacting certain measures
designed to protect consumers from medical negligence.19
The most widely cited change brought about by the new legislation
was the adoption of a cap on non-economic damages in medical negli-
gence actions. 20 Section 54 of Senate Bill 2-D enacted Florida Statutes
section 766.118, which provides, among other things, that non-economic
14. I recognize the problems associated with using the term "tort reform," and its loaded
meaning in the popular press. See, e.g., Alfred P. Carlton, Tort Wars: Simple Messages, Complex
Issues, ABA J., Mar. 2003 at 6. I will nonetheless use the term liberally throughout this paper, as
its loaded meaning is by now so well known to the average reader that the term will not likely
cause significant problems of comprehension.
15. FLA. STAT. ch. 766.112 (2002).
16. Wayne J. Guglielmo, Tort Reform Battles: Sometimes the Force is with You, MED. ECON.,
July 26, 1999, available at http://www.memag.com.
17. Greg Groeller & Robyn Suriano, Lawmakers Leery of Award Limits, OR.ANDO SENTINEL,
Sept. 22, 2002, at A19.
18. 2003 Fla. Laws ch. 416.
19. Id.
20. 2003 Fla. Laws ch. 416, § 54.
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damages "shall not exceed $500,000 per claimant. '21  The level of
$500,000 was greater than the $250,000 cap first envisioned for the leg-
islation, as the Florida Senate proved unwilling to go along with a ceil-
ing of $250,000.22 In return for the higher level for the caps on non-
economic damages, the Senate gave in to the House's demands for
changes in insurance bad faith law and adopted the House's legislative
findings of fact. 3
Yet the $500,000 cap on non-economic damages is not absolute. If
medical malpractice victims are left in a "permanent vegetative state" or
die from negligent medical care, the total non-economic damages can
increase, up to $1 million. 24 Furthermore, even if the victim is not left in
a permanent vegetative state, the non-economic damages can increase to
$1 million if: (a) the trial court determines that the non-economic harm
to the patient was "particularly severe" and (b) the malpractice caused
the victim to suffer a "catastrophic injury."
25
For hospitals and other "nonpractitioner defendants" in malpractice
lawsuits, the cap on non-economic damages is $750,000, up from the
$500,000 cap for "practitioner defendants. '26 As with practitioners, the
cap is doubled if the negligence leaves the victim dead or in a permanent
vegetative state, or if the non-economic damage was particularly severe
and the patient suffered catastrophic injury. 27 For the most severe inju-
ries caused by medical negligence, a claimant could potentially recover
up to $1 million in non-economic damages from the negligent doctors,
and $1.5 million from the negligent hospitals or other non-practitioner
defendants to the lawsuit.
A second key provision to Senate Bill 2-D is its limitation of bad
faith actions against insurance companies. 28 The legislature enacted
Florida Statutes section 766.1185, erecting certain barriers to recovery
of excess damages from insurers who were not willing to deal with mal-
practice claimants in good faith.29 An insurance company can avoid a
claim for bad faith if it tenders the limits of a defendant's policy within
210 days after service of process of the initial complaint in the cause of
action. This time period is extended by an additional 60 days if the
claimant provided new information to the insurance company after 150
21. Id.
22. Joni James, Deal Struck on Medical Malpractice Insurance, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 8,
2003, at IA.
23. Id.
24. 2003 Fla. Laws ch. 416, § 54(2)(b).
25. Id.
26. Id. § 54(3)(a).
27. Id.
28. Id. § 56.
29. Id.
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days following service of process. 3° Alternatively, the 210/270-day time
period may be set aside if the insurer tenders an offer for the policy
limits within 60 days of the following events: (1) deposition of all claim-
ants; (2) deposition of all defendants; (3) deposition of all the claimant's
medical experts; (4) the initial disclosure of witnesses and production of
documents; and (5) mediation as required by Florida Statutes section
766.108.31
Furthermore, where the time limits outlined above are inapplicable
to the bad faith claim, the legislature provided that the trial court shall
balance evidence of 10 different criteria in determining whether an
insurer acted in bad faith regarding a malpractice cause of action.32
These ten factors vary from the actions of the insurer in attempting to
settle the claim to any misrepresentations made by the claimant in the
settlement negotiations.33
While limiting the legal rights afforded victims of medical errors,
the legislature passed certain measures calculated to reduce the chance
that consumers would suffer from medical negligence. These include:
" Requiring licensed medical facilities to adopt a patient safety
plan and a patient safety committee to oversee compliance with
the plan.34
" Notification of patients where there has been "adverse incidents
that result in serious harm to the patient.
35
" Requiring doctors to undergo a two-hour course in limiting
medical errors as part of their continuing medical education.36
* Creation by the Florida Department of Health of a "practitioner
profile," containing certain information about each doctor that
consumers may access.37
* Placing records of medical negligence causes of action within
each practitioner profile maintained by the Florida Department
of Health.38
As passed, the new medical malpractice legislation comprehen-
sively overhauled the legal system by which claimants alleging negli-
gence may recover for medical mistakes. While the most contentious





34. Id. § 6.
35. Id. §§ 7, 8.
36. Id. § 11.
37. Id. §§ 14, 15.
38. Id. § 17.
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is outside the scope of this Comment. By capping a claimant's recovery
and limiting bad faith actions against insurers, the legislature virtually
ensured that there will be constitutional challenges to the legislation.39
It remains to be seen whether the new legislation will pass constitutional
muster in the face of promised challenges to the Act.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD
In Florida, malpractice reforms have historically been challenged
on the basis of denying persons access to the courts, a right guaranteed
by the state's constitution.4 ° It is a common criticism of any effort to
limit victims' recoveries; the basis for these challenges is that victims of
negligence or other wrongs are entitled to adjudication of their griev-
ances and compensation from the tortfeasors. These arguments funda-
mentally are rooted in the philosophy of who should bear the burden of a
person's wrongdoing. Tort reform is therefore challenged because of a
belief that: "Although isolated victims may suffer at the negligent hands
of another, society as a whole should not be forced to bear the burden of
misconduct by the wrongdoer who does not fear legal or moral
restraints. Accountability must be encouraged in a civilized society;
indeed, it must be mandated."4 Taken further away from mere account-
ability, it is a calculus that puts the rights of victims ahead of the mainte-
nance of commerce. 42 The argument, then, is that without allowing
victims to hold wrongdoers accountable, the costs of their wrongdoing
shifts from the guilty party to society as a whole, instituting a system of
corporate welfare.43
When the Florida Supreme Court analyzed whether legislation vio-
lates Article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution, it determined in
Kluger v. White" that legislation cannot abolish the right of access to
the courts without providing some alternative method of redress.45
Where there is no alternative redress provided, the legislature must show
"an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of such right"
and that there is no way to meet that necessity without abolishing the
39. Mary Ellen Klas, Duel Continues on Eve of Malpractice Law, PALM BEACH POST, Sept.
13, 2003, at 1A.
40. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21 ("The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any
injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.").
41. Robert A. Clifford, Runaway Juries? The Facts Say No, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 21, 2000, at 15.
42. Id. ("It may be handy for corporations and insurance companies to calculate the cost of
maiming or killing people, but there are those in our society who believe that the scales of justice
are more important than the wheels of commerce.").
43. See Richard H. Middleton, Beating Back Tort 'Reform,' NAT'L LAW JOURNAL, Aug. 7,
2000, at A 19.
44. 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
45. Id. at 4.
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right of access to the courts.4 6
It was on the basis of Article I, section 21 of the state constitution
that both the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers and the insurance indus-
try attacked parts of the 1986 comprehensive tort reform legislation, spe-
cifically the bill's $450,000 cap on non-economic damages and limits on
joint and several liability. 47 As to the $450,000 cap on non-economic
damages, the Florida Supreme Court held that under Kluger there was
neither a reasonable alternative remedy or commensurate benefit nor "a
legislative showing of overpowering public necessity for the abolish-
ment of the right and no alternative method of meeting such public
necessity. 48 It was specifically reasoned that a medical patient would
get no "compensatory benefit" from a cap on non-economic damages
because it is not likely that the medical patient's negligence causes the
medical error and the injury in the case.49
The court used rather strong language for determining when the
legislature could cap non-economic damages, clearly establishing that its
reception of such legislative caps would be cool if there were no explicit
benefit granted the tort victim in return.50 As to the limits placed on
joint and several liability of defendants, however, the Florida Supreme
Court determined that this was not a violation of Article I, section 21, as
the right to access the courts did not include the right "to recover for
injuries beyond those caused by the particular defendant."'"
While the Kluger and subsequent Smith decisions seem to point to
jurisprudence that would render the cap on non-economic damages
unconstitutional for violation of Article I, section 21, there are some
exceptions inherent in the reasoning of these cases that would point to
ways in which the legislature could frame its findings of fact to make the
46. Id.
47. Smith v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1087 (Fla. 1987). In an odd twist, the Academy
of Florida Trial Lawyers and representatives from the insurance industry teamed up to challenge
the 1986 legislation. The Trial Lawyers challenged it on the basis of limitations it placed on
plaintiffs' recoveries, while the insurance industry was most concerned with tighter controls
placed on the industry by the legislature.
48. Id. at 1088 (emphasis in original).
49. Id.
50. Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1089. Specifically, the court stated:
This reasoning fails to recognize that we are dealing with a constitutional right
which may not be restricted simply because the legislature deems it rational to do
so. Rationality only becomes relevant if the legislature provides an alternative
remedy or abrogates or restricts the right based on a showing of overpowering
public necessity and that no alternative method of meeting that necessity exists.
Here, however, the legislature has provided nothing in the way of an alternative
remedy or commensurate benefit and one can only speculate, in an act of faith, that
somehow the legislative scheme will benefit the tort victim.
Id.
51. Id. at 1091.
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caps constitutional. First, the legislature could provide some alternate
remedy or commensurate benefit to victims of medical malpractice in
exchange for the caps.52 For example, the Automobile Reparations
Reform Act, 3 which provided for tort immunity for defendants under
some circumstances, was deemed constitutional because it provided a
benefit in exchange for the inability to sue for non-economic damage.54
Second, the legislature could make extensive findings of fact, showing
some overriding public necessity was met by capping non-economic
damages at $500,000, and that there was no way to meet this public
necessity other than the caps. In passing the 2003 law, the legislature
chose to do both: it erected some concomitant patient protection mea-
sures in addition to the caps and made extensive findings of fact as to the
necessity of the caps.
Yet the legislative findings of fact do not end the courts' constitu-
tional scrutiny of the new legislation. In a recent Florida Supreme Court
decision, it was determined that the courts may second-guess the legisla-
ture's statements of policy and fact in enacting new legislation. 6 The
court upheld the maxims that the legislature's statements of policy and
fact are presumptively correct and entitled to deference by the courts.
57
Nonetheless, the court also established that when assessing the constitu-
tionality of the legislation, it is the duty of the trial court to scrutinize
these statements, and only uphold them where they are based on actual
findings of fact rather than mere conclusory statements 8.5  Therefore,
where the facts recited by the legislature do not jibe with the factual
findings of the trial court, the court may substitute its own determina-
tions of the facts supporting the legislation for those of the legislature.59
In enacting the $500,000 cap on non-economic damages, the legis-
lature advanced certain factual findings that these caps are necessary to
ensure adequate levels of health care are provided to Florida consumers.
52. See id. at 1088.
53. FLA. STAT. ch. 627.737 (1974).
54. Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 14 (Fla. 1974). Specifically, the court stated:
In exchange for his former right to damages for pain and suffering in the limited
category of cases where such items are preempted by the act, he receives not only a
prompt recovery of his major, salient out-of-pocket losses - even where he is at
fault - but also an immunity from being held liable for the pain and suffering of
the other parties to he accident if they should fall within this limited class where
such items are not recoverable.
Id.
55. Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1088.
56. See N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, No. SCO1-843, 2003 WL
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However, courts should be willing to rule on evidence as to the basis for
these findings. If a claimant can show that no correlation exists between
caps on non-economic damages and access to health care, the courts
have the power to declare the statute unconstitutional on the basis of the
Kluger and Smith decisions.
Furthermore, the benefit to the consumer may not survive judicial
scrutiny. If the measures discussed in Section III, supra, prove ill suited
to protecting consumers from medical errors, a court could also deter-
mine that the legislation is unconstitutional. Following Kluger and
Smith, the concomitant benefit to consumers must be real. If patient
safety measures enacted by Senate Bill 2-D are ineffectual, the courts
could determine that the legislation provides no consumer benefit corre-
sponding to the detriment of the non-economic damages caps, and could
thereby rule the statute unconstitutional.
In any event, both sides - those representing doctors and those
representing plaintiffs - should ready themselves with empirical evi-
dence to present to a court when either challenging or reaffirming the
legislative findings. The remainder of this Comment will discuss these
findings of fact and scrutinize them in light of present information that
either supports or challenges the findings.
V. LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS
To deal with potential constitutional challenges, section 1 of Senate
Bill 2-D sets forth several legislative findings.6" These can broadly be
broken up into three categories: (1) findings of the state of the present
malpractice insurance market; (2) findings from the Governor's Select
Task Force on Healthcare Professional Liability Insurance, convened to
make recommendations about how to lower malpractice insurance rates;
and (3) findings detailing the necessity of caps on non-economic dam-
ages in medical malpractice actions.
A. The State of the Industry
The first set of Legislative Findings in S.B. 2-D includes six find-
ings that point to problems in the present industry that will be addressed
before this legislation:6"
(1) The Legislature finds that Florida is in the midst of a medical
malpractice insurance crisis of unprecedented magnitude.
(2) The Legislature finds that this crisis threatens the quality and
availability of health care for all Florida citizens.
60. 2003 Fla. Laws ch. 416.
61. Id. § 1.
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(3) The Legislature finds that the rapidly growing population and
the changing demographics of Florida make it imperative that
students continue to choose Florida as the place they will
receive their medical educations and practice medicine.
(4) The Legislature finds that Florida is among the states with the
highest medical malpractice insurance premiums in the nation.
(5) The Legislature finds that the cost of medical malpractice
insurance has increased dramatically during the past decade
and both the increase and current cost are substantially higher
than the national average.
(6) The Legislature finds that the increase in medical malpractice
liability insurance rates is forcing physicians to practice
medicine without professional liability insurance, to leave
Florida, to not perform high-risk procedures, or to retire early
from the practice of medicine.
There is no question that the cost of medical malpractice insurance
for doctors in Florida is on the rise. 62 After experiencing relatively sta-
ble costs for medical malpractice coverage during the majority of the
1990s, doctors face increases in average malpractice premiums that are
estimated to have been as high as 30% in each of 2001 and 2002.63 In
percentage terms, these are very large increases, but the raw percentage
growth must be put into context.
Between 1996 and 2001, the total value of written premiums in
Florida jumped 64%, to a level of $650 million.' This contrasts to
growth of just 26% throughout the United States as a whole, as total
written premiums nation-wide grew to $7.6 billion.65 Stated in terms of
per-doctor averages, the premium levels across Florida in 2001 eclipsed
those in the country as a whole, averaging $16,424, 55% greater than the
62. See, e.g., Governor Jeb Bush, Exec. Order No. 02-241 (Aug. 28, 2002).
63. See, e.g., Bush Creates Task Force on Medical Malpractice Insurance, NAPLES DAILY
NEWS, Aug. 29, 2002, available at http://web.naplesnews.com/02/08/florida/d820153a.htm (last
visited Mar. 26, 2004). See also Tim Stapleton, The Perfect Storm: The Current Medical
Malpractice Crisis, Florida Chapter of the American College of Cardiology, Oct. 2001, available
at http://www.accfl.org/articles/artcl-storm.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2004) (estimating the
increases at 25% per year in 2001 and 2002).
64. http://www.fha.org/ See RICHARD S. BIONDI ET AL., FLORIDA HOsPrrAL ASSOCIATION,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ANALYSIS 11 (Nov. 7, 2002) (on file with author). The FHA's data
reflecting written premiums of $650 million is the highest level of written premiums reported in
the literature for 2001 and exceeds the Governor's Task Force on Healthcare Professional
Liability Insurance estimates, which placed the value at around $570.7 million. See JOHN C. Hrrr
ET AL., REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S SELECT TASK FORCE ON HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY INsURANCE 62-63 (2003), available at http://www.tha.org/acrobat/
DOHLargeFinalBook.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
65. Id.
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nationwide average of $10,373 per doctor.6 6
While growing in current terms, the values are less stark when
adjusted into real terms, factoring in the Consumer Price Index for Med-
ical Care Services. The table below shows that by comparing data in
terms of 2000 dollars, the average premium per doctor actually declined
by 32.5% between 1991 and 2000 to a value of $7,844 per doctor. Of
course, this data is incomplete and analyzing this growth will require
updated figures for 2001 and 2002, since much of the premium growth
occurred over the past two years. In addition, Florida-specific analysis
is required to put this data in context.
UNITED STATES AVERAGE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
PREMIUM PER DOCTOR
67
Total Premiums Consumer Price Index Average Premium per
Year Collected (US$) Medical Care Services Doctor(US$)*
1991 4,862,170 176.1 11,614
1992 5,138,395 189.7 11,033
1993 5,174,055 202.6 10,119
1994 5,931,898 212.6 10,828
1995 6,080,639 223.5 10,031
1996 5,992,394 231.9 9,302
1997 5,917,038 238.7 8,701
1998 6,195,047 246.5 8,581
1999 6,155,241 254.6 8,051
2000 6,375,401 265.6 7,844
% Change 31.1% 50.8% -32.5%
Note: * All average values of premiums collected per doctor are given in terms of US dollar amounts
adjusted for inflation to 2000 levels, based on the Consumer Price Index of Medical Care
Services as of July 1 of each year.
In addition to statistics showing high premium growth, the legisla-
ture's concern was fuelled by anecdotal accounts of doctors forced to
either practice elsewhere or give up certain specializations in the face of
higher medical malpractice insurance premiums. 68 Some high-risk spe-
cialists in areas such as surgery or obstetrics and gynecology have felt a
66. Id. In its calculation of a per-doctor average, the FHA data estimates the number of
doctors in Florida to be 39,576, somewhat higher than the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS),
which places the number of doctors in Florida at 20,980 during 2001. See 2001 State Occupational
Employment and Wage Estimates, Florida, at http://www.bls.gov/oes/2001/oesfl.htm (last visited
Mar. 26, 2004). Taking the lower number given by the BLS, the per-doctor premium can be
estimated at $30,981.
67. Medical Malpractice Insurance Rates, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the
House, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. Exhibit A (2002) (statement of Travis
Plunkett, Legislative Dir. Consumer Fed'n of Am.), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/
MedMalHouse testimony.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2004). Data on the number of doctors was
taken from the Statistical Abstract of the United States; medical care inflation data was taken from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics; and data on premium levels was taken from the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners' Report on Profit by Line by State. Id.
68. See John Dorschner, Doctor, Lawyer Battle Costly, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 5, 2002, at C 1.
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squeeze and are declining to offer their services, moving into general
practice or out of the practice of medicine altogether.69 These doctors
cite an inability to turn a profit due to increased medical malpractice
premiums charged by their insurance companies and an inability to pass
these costs onto their patients because of managed care contracts and
low Medicare payouts.7"
Stories about doctors who have left the profession as a result of
high medical malpractice insurance premiums and low compensation
from managed care groups abound. Most are similar to that of Dr. Ter-
rance Havig, a surgeon who retired in August 2002, when his annual
premium reached $78,000 for half-time practice; he determined that he
could no longer profitably practice general surgery.71 There are also
stories of hospitals - such as the NCH North Collier Hospital - drop-
ping emergency surgery or obstetrical services because there are not
enough physicians to offer these services.72
But the problem extends beyond rising premium costs. There is
also a decided lack of insurance coverage in general as several compa-
nies have stopped doing business in the state. Between 1998 and 2000,
seven insurers dropped the medical malpractice line of services in Flor-
ida.73 Five of these companies, Unisource, Gulf Atlantic, Caduceus,
Frontier, and PHICO stopped selling insurance altogether as they have
gone out of business. 74 The other two insurers, Scottsdale and Fire-
man's Fund, are still selling insurance, but no longer offering medical
malpractice lines. Further, one of the largest insurers, The St. Paul
Companies, has recently exited the market.75 Whereas there were over
40 insurers in Florida writing medical malpractice policies in 1998, there
were less than 10 in 2002.76
The problems of high medical malpractice insurance premiums and
69. Liz Freeman, Insurance Squeeze Tightens for Another SW Florida Surgeon, NAPLES
DAiLy NEWS, Sept. 9, 2002, available at http://web.naplesnews.com/02/09/naples/d799065a.htm
(last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
70. Id.
71. Liz Freeman, Hospitals Warn Area Medical Care May Be Impacted by High Insurance
Rates, NAPLES DA.y NEWS, Aug. 13, 2002, available at http://www.naplesdailynews.coml02/08/
naples/d802404a.htm http://web.naplesnews.corn02/08/naples/d802404a.htm (last visited Mar.
26, 2004).
72. Id.
73. Stapleton, supra note 63.
74. Id.
75. See The St. Paul Companies, Inc., Annual Report Form 10-K For the Fiscal Year Ended
December 31, 2001, Mar. 29, 2002, at 6.
76. Letter from Coalition to Ensure Patient Access (CEPA) to the Honorable J. Dudley
Goodlette, Chair, Medical Liability Insurance Workgroup 1 (Nov. 8, 2002), available at http:l/
www.leg.state.fl.us/publicationsl2003/ use/reports/med-liability/pdfs/44%200rganizations.pdf
(last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
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lower compensation within the medical profession pose a threat to the
variety and quality of medical services offered in the state.77 The cur-
rent period of premium increases is distinguishable from similar costs
increases in the 1970s and 1980s in that doctors can no longer pass
through these costs to their patients; more patients are part of HMO or
other managed care groups which have the bargaining power to refuse
higher costs. 78 In this environment, different governmental and private
groups have taken action in an attempt to resolve the problems facing
doctors in Florida.
B. The Governor's Select Task Force on Healthcare Professional
Liability Insurance
The legislature also made three findings referencing the Governor's
Select Task Force on Healthcare Professional Liability Insurance:
79
(8) The Governor created the Governor's Select Task Force on
Healthcare Professional Liability Insurance to study and make
recommendations to address these problems.
(9) The Legislature has reviewed the findings and recommenda-
tions of the Governor's Select Task Force on Healthcare Profes-
sional Liability Insurance.
(10) The Legislature finds that the Governor's Select Task Force on
Healthcare Professional Liability Insurance has established that
a medical malpractice crisis exists in the State of Florida which
can be alleviated by the adoption of comprehensive legislatively
enacted reforms.
Governor Jeb Bush convened the Task Force on August 28, 2002.80
Its role was to examine the causes of the increasing costs of medical
malpractice insurance and propose solutions to the problem.8 The Gov-
ernor's Select Task Force on Healthcare Professional Liability Insurance
was composed of five members, all of whom were either a president or
trustee at a leading Florida university.82 These academic leaders were
charged with gaining an understanding of the insurance market, the liti-
gation environment, and all other issues implicated in the rising costs of
medical malpractice premiums.83
In January 2003, this Task Force recommended that medical mal-
77. Dorschner, supra note 68.
78. Id. (The comment made about doctors' inability to pass through the costs to their patients
was attributed to Bill Sage, a law professor at Columbia University).
79. 2003 Fla. Laws ch. 416, § 1.
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practice awards for non-economic damages be capped at $250,000.84
From this recommendation, the panel had only one dissenter, Donna
Shalala, President of the University of Miami, who instead recom-
mended a flexible cap on non-economic damages, which would take into
account catastrophic situations where the $250,000 cap would prove
insufficient.8 5 Rejecting Shalala's position on sliding scale caps, the
Task Force went even further, recommending sovereign immunity for
emergency room physicians and mandated mediation in medical mal-
practice claims, to occur within 120 days of filing a lawsuit.86
Armed with the Task Force recommendations, private groups of
physicians and hospitals began efforts to lobby the legislature for a
$250,000 cap on non-economic damages in medical malpractice litiga-
tion.87 In addition, the Florida Medical Association began a push to get
an amendment capping medical malpractice awards onto the 2004 bal-
lot.88 The efforts of the medical community, therefore, centered on cap-
ping non-economic damages, premised on an assumption that the reason
the premiums are on the rise is because of large awards given by juries
in medical malpractice cases. They also pointed to similar caps in other
states such as California, Colorado, and South Dakota as successful
model legislation upon which to base their efforts.
It is undisputed that the cost of medical malpractice insurance in
Florida has increased over the past two years, and that the problem
potentially threatens many doctors who practice in the state. Significant
disagreement exists, however, over the reasons for the sudden increase:
Proponents of caps on non-economic damages point to statistics of run-
away jury awards; those who disagree with that position point to other
factors such as losses taken by insurance companies in the stock market.
The Task Force considered evidence and recommendations from a vari-
ety of sources.8 9 Its findings were published and ultimately adopted by
the legislature in enacting Senate Bill 2-D. Therefore, any attack on the
sufficiency of the legislature's findings of fact in the Bill should neces-
sarily involve a critique of the Task Force's findings and recommenda-
tions. The next section will detail possible attacks on several of these
84. See, e.g., Phil Galewitz, Panel Urges $250,000 Malpractice Award Cap, PALM BEACH
POST, Jan. 17, 2003, at IA.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Freeman, supra note 71.
88. Id.
89. Governor's Select Task Force on Healthcare Professional Liability Insurance, Jan. 29,
2003, available at http://www.doh.state.fl.us/myflorida/DOH-Large-Final%2OBook.pdf (last
visited Mar. 26, 2004).
1300 [Vol. 58:1285
2004] NEW FLORIDA MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LEGISLATION
conclusions that could be advanced in challenging the constitutionality
of the legislation.
A. The Need for Caps on Non-Economic Damages
The third category of legislative findings dealt with the necessity
for the measures enacted in Senate Bill 2-D, including caps on non-
economic damages in medical malpractice actions: 90
(7) The Legislature finds that there are certain elements of damage
presently recoverable that have no monetary value, except on a
purely arbitrary basis, while other elements of damage are either
easily measured on a monetary basis or reflect ultimate mone-
tary loss.
(11) The Legislature finds that making high-quality health care avail-
able to the citizens of this state is an overwhelming public
necessity.
(12) The Legislature finds that ensuring that physicians continue to
practice in Florida is an overwhelming public necessity.
(13) The Legislature finds that ensuring the availability of affordable
professional liability insurance for physicians is an overwhelm-
ing public necessity.
(14) The Legislature finds, based upon the findings and recommen-
dations of the Governor's Select Task Force on Healthcare Pro-
fessional Liability Insurance, the findings and recommendations
of various study groups throughout the nation, and the experi-
ence of other states, that the overwhelming public necessities of
making quality health care available to the citizens of this state,
of ensuring that physicians continue to practice in Florida, and
of ensuring that those physicians have the opportunity to
purchase affordable professional liability insurance cannot be
met unless a cap on non-economic damages is imposed.
(15) The Legislature finds that the high cost of medical malpractice
claims can be substantially alleviated by imposing a limitation
on non-economic damages in medical malpractice actions.91
There are two primary areas in which these findings may be chal-
lenged. First, the measures were not necessary to ensure access to medi-
cal care in Florida, because access to medical care was not threatened in
the first place. Second, the statement that capping non-economic dam-
ages is the only way to alleviate the doctors' burdens of high malpractice
premiums is simply untrue.
90. 2003 Fla. Laws ch. 416, § 1.
91. Id.
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1. ENSURING ACCESS TO MEDICAL CARE
The first challenge to the legislative findings of necessity for the
new malpractice legislation is that the measures passed are not necessary
for ensuring consumer access to medical care in the state. Even as mal-
practice rates rose over the past several years, the number of doctors
practicing in Florida has been on the rise, and anecdotal evidence from
the state and county medical boards that record numbers of doctors are
leaving the state has not been borne out statistically.
At the same time as the Special Session of the Florida Legislature
was finally ratifying the Act, the U.S. General Accounting Office pub-
lished its report to Congress detailing the impact of rising malpractice
premiums on the access to medical care.92 In this report, the GAO found
evidence that contradicted the widely reported anecdotes that doctors
were leaving the state of Florida in record numbers. Specifically, the
GAO found that:
Reports of physician departures in Florida were anecdotal, not exten-
sive, and in some cases we determined them to be inaccurate. For
example, state medical society officials told us that Collier and Lee
counties lost all of their neurosurgeons due to malpractice concerns;
however, we found at least five neurosurgeons practicing in each
county as of April 2003. Provider groups also reported that malprac-
tice pressures have recently made it difficult for Florida to recruit or
retain physicians of any type; however, over the past 2 years the
number of new medical licenses issued has increased and physicians
per capita has remained unchanged.93
Therefore, the anecdotal evidence of the plight of physicians leav-
ing the state because of high malpractice premiums is not borne out
statistically, when one looks at the number of physicians practicing here.
Nonetheless, it is logical to expect that if Florida's malpractice premi-
ums continue to rise at a greater rate than premiums in other states, this
situation could change. Anecdotal evidence of doctors quitting practice
or refusing to perform risky procedures should be heeded. Yet, the pol-
icy of ensuring patient access to care should be examined from a broader
perspective than merely how many doctors are practicing in Florida.
The public policy of ensuring access to medical care is stated in
two different ways. Proponents of doctor- and insurer-favorable mecha-
nisms for lowering malpractice premiums take the position that keeping
premiums low results in more doctors and therefore better access to care
for consumers. The flip side of this argument is that mere doctor/patient
92. U.S. General Accounting Office, Medical Malpractice: Implications of Rising Premiums
on Access to Health Care, GAO-03-836 (Aug. 2003).
93. Id. at 17-18.
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ratios may hint at a better quantity of care available, but that the current
system ensures a better quality of care by holding doctors fully account-
able for malpractice. Therefore, the legislature has to account for both
quantitative and qualitative measures of patient access to medical care in
Florida.
As to numbers of physicians, the legislature accepted anecdotal and
pseudo-quantitative evidence that doctors are leaving practice or Florida
because their premiums are too high. Dr. Denise Baker, who was
invited by the White House to speak to the problem in early 2003,
quoted statistics from the Florida Medical Association that 900 doctors
left the state in 1999 and another 1,200 left in 2000.94 Her estimates
placed the number leaving Florida in 2001 at 5,000.91 The problem with
her data is that it does not account for new doctors either moving to the
state during these years or beginning practice within the state. Further-
more, there is nation-wide evidence that suggests that capping damages
will not necessarily keep doctors in the state.96
Supplementing this problematic data on doctors leaving the state,
there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that doctors who would otherwise
still be practicing medicine in Florida are no longer doing so because of
high malpractice premiums. 97 These stories often lead advocates of
reform to make conclusions that departure of practitioners hinders
access to medical care:
Other physician specialists and sub-specialists in medicine face the
same plight of unavailable or unaffordable insurance. They are clos-
ing their doors, discontinuing coverage for hospital emergency
rooms, or simply leaving the state. The departure of these highly-
skilled sub-specialists disrupts the referral process utilized by primary
care physicians, further hindering access to the best o modem medi-
cal care contained within the skilled medical team. If the team can-
94. Donna Wright, Bush Told of Doctor Exodus: Florida's Malpractice Crisis, BRADENTON
HERALD, Jan. 17, 2003 at Al.
95. Id.
96. Statement of Senator Edward M. Kennedy in Opposition to the Medical Malpractice
Amendment: Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act of 2001, July 26, 2002, available
at http://www.senate.gov/%7Ekennedy.statements/02/07/2002730306.html. He states that
national data from the AMA shows that in states with caps on non-economic damages, there are
233 doctors per 100,000 persons, while states with caps average just 223 doctors per 100,000;
states without caps have 29 ob/gyn's per 100,000 residents, while states with caps have just 27.4
per 100,000).
97. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 69; Kris Hundley, Malpractice Insurance Crisis Hits
Home, ST. P TERSBURG TIMEs, Aug. 17, 2002, available at http://www.sptimes.com/2002/08/l7/
Business/Malpracticeinsurance.shtml (last visited Mar. 26, 2004); Press Release, Florida
Hospital Association, Medical Liability Insurance Crisis Forces Hospitals to Close, Reduce
Services Statewide, New Data Shows (Jan. 2, 2003) (on file with author) (chronicles hospital
department closures due to high medical malpractice costs over the three years to 2003).
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not be assembled when a patient is in need, that patient will suffer.9 8
No matter how many doctors are available to treat patients, how-
ever, the system can only meet consumer needs if there is high-quality
care available that engenders consumer confidence in the system. It is
argued that the threat of malpractice gives doctors incentives to practice
better medicine, paying greater attention to areas of their practices which
may give rise to malpractice claims.99 Doctors and hospitals have
adopted practices of better record keeping, spending more time with
patients, and having more involved discussions leading to informed con-
sent in order to reduce their exposure." It is argued that, "Given the
dangerously uneven quality of state medical board regulation of doctors,
it is extremely important that patients be able to 'regulate' the quality of
doctor care by holding them accountable in court." '
Challenging legislative findings on access to medical care in Flor-
ida may therefore consider the quality of available care rather than
merely the quantity of doctors. Both quantity and quality must be con-
sidered when assessing whether capping non-economic damages
enhances access to medical care. If premiums are too high as a percent-
age of doctor compensation, this could result in some physicians leaving
practice or leaving the state, negatively impacting the quantity of care.
However, if the recovery standards are too lax, the quality of care may
suffer as physicians and medical groups lose incentives to institute qual-
ity assurance programs. Merely limiting patient recovery in order to
drive down insurance premiums may ensure that doctors practice
medicine in Florida, but the legislation will only ensure that there is
"quality health care available to the citizens of this state" if it effectively
controls the quality of the health care delivered by these physicians.
2. THE NECESSITY FOR THE CAPS
"Everybody's suing, it seems like. There are too many lawsuits in
America, and there are too many lawsuits filed against doctors and hos-
98. Letter from Florida Academy of Family Physicians, to J. Dudley Goodlette, Chair,
Medical Liability Insurance Workgroup (Nov. 6, 2002), available at http://www.leg.state.fl.us/
publications/2003/house/reports/med-liability/pdfs/FL%20Academy%20of%2Family%20
Physicians.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
99. Medical Malpractice: A Continuing Problem with Far-Reaching Implications: Hearing
Before the House Subcnmm. on Ways and Means, GAO/T-HRD-90-24, at 10 (Apr. 26, 1990)
(statement of Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller General of the United States).
100. Id.
101. Public Citizen, Bush Administration Grandstanding on Medical Malpractice, Failing
Patients in Need of Better Medical Care, available at http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/
printrelease.cfm?ID=1165 (July 25, 2002) (quoting Sidney Wolfe, M.D., director of Public
Citizen's Health Research Group).
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pitals without merit."10 2
Another aspect embedded in the legislature's findings of fact in
favor of capping non-economic damages is that plaintiff verdicts have
strained the system by providing "certain elements of [non-economic]
damage presently recoverable that have no monetary value, except on a
purely arbitrary basis."' 03 In nearly every call for malpractice reform in
Florida, plaintiff verdicts have been held up as a primary culprit, threat-
ening the practice of medicine with arbitrary damages awards. For
example, in enacting the 1988 reform measures to medical malpractice,
the Florida Legislature similarly found that "[tihe primary cause of
increased medical malpractice liability insurance premiums has been the
substantial increase in loss payments to claimants caused by tremendous
increases in the amounts of paid claims."' " Because this argument is
seemingly at the root of every call for reform from the medical and
insurance communities, the bases and data used in shaping the argument
must be examined within the present context.
a. The Case for Caps
In both federal and state venues, calls for capping non-economic
damages for medical malpractice claims have been couched in terms of
"runaway litigation" and "excessive jury awards." ' 5 At a speech at the
University of Scranton, President Bush stated that "excessive jury
awards will continue to drive up insurance costs, will put good doctors
out of business or run them out of your community.' 0 6 Going even
further, the American Medical Association has deemed the entire jury
system in the United States a "lottery, where select patients receive
astronomical awards, and others pay higher costs for health care and
suffer access problems because of it."' 7
To support this view, statistics are often used which show the very
high value of awards to plaintiffs in medical malpractice causes of
action. National data is the most readily available and the data most
often cited to by proponents of capping non-economic damages. For
example, a statistic often cited is that of median jury verdicts against
doctors. The St. Paul Companies developed data that showed the
102. Greg Groeller, Bush Touts Award Cap on Medical Malpractice, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan.
17, 2003, at Al (quoting President George W. Bush).
103. 2003 Fla. Laws ch. 416, § 1.
104. FLA. STAT. ch. 766.201 (2002). The statute, enacted in 1988 as Chapter 88-1, § 48, is the
legislative findings and intent for the 1988 medical malpractice reform measures that were
enacted.
105. See Groeller, supra note 102.
106. Id.
107. John Hillman, AMA Pushes for Federal Med-Mal Legislation, BEST'S INS. NEWS, Aug.
14. 2002 (via BestWire).
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median jury verdict in medical malpractice cases in 1994 to be
$375,000, rising to $800,000 by 1999.108 These figures accord with
those promulgated by Jury Verdict Research based in Horsham, Penn-
sylvania, which stated that the median medical malpractice jury award
was $800,000 in 1999, up from $750,000 in 1998. °9
These averages from the late 1990s are contrasted to the situation in
the early 1990s where "the frequency of medical malpractice claims that
physicians filed with insurance companies declined and the dollar
amounts attached to those claims . . . hovered around or below
$500,000. "' ° In addition to high verdicts from juries, the values of set-
tlements are also increasing, with the median settlement in 1999 reach-
ing $650,000, up 30% from the 1998 level. 11
Another common strategy for valuation of jury awards is to cite the
very high values of individual awards. Statistics have been cited that in
1997, only two verdicts topped $20 million, but in 2001 there were 12
over the $20 million mark, with a $269 million judgment given by a jury
in Dallas, Texas." 2 Jury Verdict Research has been cited to show that
some 45% of plaintiff awards during 1998 and 1999 were greater than
$1 million, up from 39% of awards between 1997 and 1998.113 Without
citing the source of their data, the Florida Chapter of the American Col-
lege of Cardiology cited one of the highest figures as to the average jury
award, stating, "[T]he average jury verdict has increased 57% in the last
five years nationally, from $2 million to $3.5 million."
' "14
A systematic account of national data on rising costs from jury
awards can be found from the Insurance Information Institute.' 5 This
association presented information that the average jury award in medical
malpractice cases increased from $1.14 million in 1994 to $3.48 million
in 2000 (see table below). During this same time, cumulative underwrit-
ing losses among medical malpractice insurers increased from $1.7 bil-
lion in 1994 to $6.6 billion in 2000. The total underwriting loss for
2001 was estimated at $9.6 billion.
108. John Dorschner, Many Miami-Area Doctors Forgo Malpractice Insurance Due to Rates,
Jury Awards, Miti HERALD, Feb. 3, 2002, at 1E.
109. See Tanya Albert, Malpractice Awards Pushing Insurance Premiums Higher, Juries Are
Awarding Higher Dollar Amounts in Malpractice Cases, Hitting Physicians in the Pocketbook,




112. Dorschner, supra note 108.
113. See Albert, supra note 109.
114. Stapleton, supra note 63.
115. Robert P. Hartwig, Trends in Medical Malpractice: Behind the Chaos, Presentation of the
Insurance Information Institute (Apr. 25, 2003), available at http://server.iii.org/yy-obj-data/
binary/695301-1 0/medmal.pdf.
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As to damages collected on medical malpractice claims in Florida,
several sources of statistics are used to show that awards are increasing
and therefore must be curbed. A primary data source is the Florida
Department of Insurance Closed Claims Database. Proponents of
reforms often use this source to show a 150% increase of paid losses
between 1991 and 2000.117 Yet, there are some recognized limitations
to the use of this Closed Claims Database."' The Closed Claims
Database is actually two separate databases: (1) an "Archive" database
containing claims to June 25, 1999, and (2) a "Current" database con-
taining claims which closed after June 25, 1999. The latter database has
been found to be incomplete. 19 Therefore, statistics are usually cited to
1999 for the Department of Insurance database, and statisticians then
often switch to cite statistics from the National Practitioners Data Bank.
A second source of data on Florida claims against doctors is the
National Practitioners Data Bank (NPDB). This source is presumably
more accurate than the Florida Department of Insurance for claims after
1999, because of the shortcomings discussed above, and is therefore
often cited for the total value of claims made after that date. The NPDB
revealed that in 2001, 1,303 claims against doctors were made in Flor-
ida, grossing compensation of $326.1 million. 2 °
When taken as a whole, the argument from proponents of reform
measures such as capping non-economic damages is that juries are
awarding more money than ever before in the state of Florida, and that
these higher awards are a major reason for the current increases in mal-
l16. Id.
117. Florida Medical Association, The Medical Liability Insurance Crisis: Fact and Fiction,
Jan. 31, 2003 (Letter to the Governor's Task Force on Medical Malpractice Liability), available at
http://www.fma.org.
118. See Letter from Richard S. Biondi, (WHO IS HE??) to the Governor's Task Force on
Health Care Professional Liability State of Florida (Jan. 8, 2003), available at
www.healflhealth.org/heal-FLhealthcare/presentationLancedeHavenSimith.html.
119. Id.
120. Florida Medical Association, The Medical Liability Insurance Crisis: Fact and Fiction,
Jan. 31, 2003. (Letter to the Governor's Task Force on Medical Malpractice Liability).
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practice premiums. They claim that the current state of affairs has
resulted in a "lottery" system whereby juries sometimes ignore facts and
sound scientific reasoning, providing astronomical awards not supported
by the evidence presented to them. It is argued that a cap on non-eco-
nomic damages would force juries to compensate victims for their medi-
cal costs and their lost wages, while curbing sentimentalism in the jury
process.
More fundamental than mere statistics is the point of view that
juries are incapable of comprehending the factual complexity of medical
malpractice actions, and are easily manipulated by the plaintiff's bar.12
The argument usually presents facts showing the medical malpractice
standard of care to be beyond a typical juror's comprehension, and
jurors are therefore open to emotional manipulation when presented with
a plaintiff with significant injuries.'22
As a whole, then, the argument against allowing the normal civil
jury trial system to determine damages in medical malpractice cases is
that they are unsophisticated, undereducated, and too prone to manipula-
tion of their sympathies. Statistics are cited for the proposition that the
end result of this skewed jury process in Florida has been a 150%
increase in compensation for medical malpractice victims in the 1990s,
resulting in the current market instability for medical malpractice
insurers.
b. The Case Against Caps
On the other side of the issue are those who claim that the jury
process is not out of control. These groups typically include the trial bar
and consumer protection groups that come armed with contrary data to
thwart what they see as misstatements by groups clamoring for reforms
on the other side.
As a first point of departure, those opposing medical malpractice
reforms usually begin by attacking the statistic that the average jury
award was $3.48 million in 2000.123 There are two main attacks of this
enormous figure. First, they argue that the figure comes from Jury Ver-
dict Research, which admits the number is flawed. 24 Jury Verdict
Research acknowledged that there are large gaps in its database, the
121. See Edward L. Holloran III, Medical Malpractice Litigation in Florida: Discussion of
Problems and Recommendations, 26 NoVA L. REV. 331, 335 (2001).
122. Id.
123. See Association of Florida Trial Lawyers, Medical Malpractice Situation Analysis 1
(2003) (Report to the Governor's Task Force).
124. Rachel Zimmerman & Christopher Oster, Insurer's Missteps Helped Provoke Malpractice
"Crisis": Lawsuits Alone Didn't Cause Premiums to Skyrocket; Earlier Price War a Factor,
WALL ST. J., June 24, 2002, at Al.
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award information is collected unsystematically, and that the service
does not know how many cases are missed by the service. 125 Further-
more, the database only captures jury awards for the plaintiff; the aver-
age figures are not hedged by the number of times that doctors and
hospitals actually win a defense verdict, which Jury Verdict Research
claims is about 62% of the time.
126
A second attack on the $3.48 million average jury award figure is
data which purports to cover average paid claims throughout the coun-
try. The Florida trial bar actually quotes data provided by FPIC, Flor-
ida's largest malpractice insurer, which states that the average paid
claim in 2000 was $288,637, with Florida's average coming in at
$247,860. 127
Opponents to currently proposed reform measures also cite Florida-
specific data as to the amount of paid claims over a historical period.
However, a significant amount of the data that is propounded by this
side comes adjusted for inflation, reducing the value of the numbers and
chilling the appearance of growth over a historical period. 128 Using data
from the Florida Department of Insurance, the AFTL argues that
adjusted for inflation, "the average payout [to victims of medical negli-
gence in Florida] has gone down by over 14% since 1991.
1
129
FLORIDA INFLATION-ADJUSTED CLAIMS VALUE, 1990-2000 130
*Current Value **C.P.I. *Real Value **C.P.I. *Real Value
of Claims All Items of Claims Medical Care of Claims
1990 $113,800 130.7 $113,800 162.8 $113,800
1991 $147,254 136.2 $141,308 177.0 $135,440
1992 $133,304 140.3 $124,183 190.1 $114,160
1993 $126,635 144.5 $114,541 201.4 $102,364
1994 $160,362 148.2 $141,426 211.0 $123,730
1995 $208,762 152.4 $179,037 220.5 $154,134
1996 $241,020 156.9 $200,773 228.2 $171,946
1997 $206,961 160.5 $168,535 234.6 $143,620
1998 $183,826 163.0 $147,399 242.1 $123,614
1999 $183,017 166.6 $143,579 250.6 $118,895
2000 $170,969 172.2 $129,766 260.8 $106,725
% Change
1990-2000 50.24 14.03 -6.22
Note: *Values in US$; **1982-84=100
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Association of Florida Trial Lawyers, supra note 123, at 2.
128. See id. at 3.
129. Id. (emphasis in original).
130. Closed Claims data from the Florida Department of Insurance Closed Claims Database;
Consumer Price Indices from the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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c. Analysis of Available Data
The most comprehensive compilation of data publicly available on
medical malpractice awards is that compiled by the Governor's Task
Force surrounding their recommendations promulgated January 2003.131
In this report, the Task Force gathered data from the Florida Department
of Insurance Closed Claims Database, as well as the National Practi-
tioner Data Bank.1 32 More accurately, data from these sources was pro-
vided the Task Force by Dr. DeHaven-Smith and Milliman USA, Inc.,
who reviewed the data and collected annual figures. 133 The Task force
gathered data from these two statistical analyses and compared their
findings for the years 1991 to 2001.
DeHaven-Smith found that between 1991 and 2001, total paid
claims increased by over 60% from $148.9 million to $239.2 million.
During this same time period, the number of claims also grew, totaling
958 in 2001. Taking these figures together, the value paid per claim
during 2001 averaged $249,726, some 31.8% higher than the average
during 1991. This increase reflects a compound average growth rate of
2.8% for the period. Put into perspective, the average income of Florida
residents during the period 1991 to 2000 grew from $20,068 to $27,764,
a compound annual increase of 3.67%.'
3
1
Analyzing per-claim data from the other methodologies reveals
even lower results. In the Mailman USA study of the Department of
Insurance Closed Claims Database, the average paid claim in 2001 was
$233,220, representing a compound annual growth rate of 2.1% since
1991.136 The company's analysis of the National Practitioners Data
Bank revealed a per-claim average of $240,047, representing compound
annual growth of 2.4% since 1991.137 In all these methodologies, it can
be seen that per claim value growth for medical malpractice lawsuits
over the past decade actually underperformed income growth.
Certainly, if the reason for capping non-economic damage awards
is a compelling need to limit juries, we would expect that awards per
claim would outperform income growth throughout the state. It is logi-
cal to presume that normal growth in economic damages would mirror
growth in average incomes, and therefore the underperforming per claim
131. HiTr ET AL., supra note 64.
132. Id. at 132.
133. Id. at 128.
134. H=TT ET AL., supra note 64.
135. Florida Agency for Workforce Innovation: Florida Research and Economic Database
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values awarded between 1991 and 2001 are strong evidence that eco-
nomic damage awards are keeping pace with income levels.
However, the data still evidences growing levels of claims and per-
claim payouts. The most significant growth was shown in DeHaven-
Smith's data, reflecting per-claim growth of 31.8% in the decade to
2001. Even starker is the 60% growth in the total paid claims data, an
increase that had to be absorbed by residual loss reserves, investment
gains or higher premiums. Therefore, while growing claims are not
likely the most compelling component of the current premium adjust-
ments, they are a factor to consider when devising legislative solutions
to rising premiums.
FLORIDA: TOTAL CLOSED CLAIMS BY YEAR, 1991-2001138
Independent
DeHaven-Smith Mailman USA, Inc. Analysis
DOI Database DOI Database NPDB DOI Database
Total Closed Total Closed Total Closed Total Closed
Paid* Claims Paid* Claims Paid* Claims Paid* Claims
1991 $148.9 786 $146.5 771 $121.4 644 $147.3 776
1992 $131.4 643 $133.8 657 $144.5 719 $133.3 664
1993 $126.2 736 $125.8 724 $146.4 786 $126.6 733
1994 $152.4 769 $159.8 802 $169.7 811 $160.4 814
1995 $203.3 933 $206.4 942 $189.0 849 $208.8 960
1996 $241.1 1,100 $239.9 1087 $237.7 1,076 $241.0 1106
1997 $208.8 1,003 $202.8 955 $223.5 1,100 $207.0 975
1998 $189.3 1,032 $182.2 1001 $214.2 1,025 $183.8 1020
1999 $207.5 791 $221.0 828 $238.9 1,045 $183.0 714
2000 $214.5 881 $223.1 891 $306.4 1,209 $171.0 594
2001 $239.2 958 $205.7 882 $102.5 427 $144.4 642
Note: *All value figures are in US$, million; independent analysis is the result of the author's own data
gathering from the Department of Insurance Closed Claims Data Base.
138. See Hrrr ar Aj., supra note 64, at 132.
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Note: *All value figures are in US$.
VI. LEGISLATIVE OMISSIONS OF FACT
In addition to problems with the actual findings of fact in the mal-
practice reforms, the legislature omitted certain factors that have cer-
tainly contributed to the current crisis involving medical malpractice
insurance premiums. There are three main factors that were not dis-
cussed in Senate Bill 2-D, but which have contributed to the present
state of the market: (1) insurance companies' mismanagement of loss
reserves; (2) negligent practitioners and the ease with which bad doctors
are licensed to practice in Florida; and (3) the financial leverage of man-
aged care companies in the health care industry, which prevents doctors
from passing on higher premium costs to consumers. By not addressing
these contributing factors, it is rather disingenuous of the legislature to
claim that capping non-economic damage awards is the only way to
solve the present crisis facing doctors in paying higher liability insur-
ance premiums.
A. Insurance Company Mismanagement of Funds
One contributing source of increasing premium costs is insurance
companies' mismanagement of loss reserves as investments took a hit in
equities markets over the past several years. Stock market performance
over the past four years has lagged well below the robust growth of the
period 1995 to 1999. Because insurance companies invest funds in the
market, it is common sense that poor returns have hurt their financial
139. Id.
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positions. However, the extent to which this has impacted insurers is a
point of great disagreement.
1. THE ECONOMY AND INVESTMENT YIELDS DID NOT
INFLUENCE PREMIUMS
In a recent report, Brown Brothers Harriman undertook to study the
effect of both poor economic performance and a declining stock market
on medical malpractice insurers.140 Analyzing the effect of changing
economies and interest rates on medical malpractice premiums, the
study searched for correlation between premium levels, annual changes
in GDP, and investment yield measured in terms of 5-year Treasury
bonds.14" ' Performing a regression analysis of macro-economic indica-
tors, investment yields, and medical malpractice premiums, the study
failed to produce a coefficient of determination of higher than 0.1505,
leading to the author's conclusion that "investment yield and the per-
formance of the economy and interest rates do not influence medical
malpractice premiums."'
' 42
Turning away from interest rates as a measure of investment and
focusing on returns from the stock market, the study further concluded:
"The decline in equity valuations is not the cause of rising medical mal-
practice premiums."' 14 1 In arriving at this conclusion, the study first ana-
lyzed the degree of equities in insurance company portfolios. Over the
five years prior to 2001, medical malpractice insurers maintained a fairly
stable equity position, comprising just 9.03% of their portfolios' values
in 2001.'" Further, the equity investing that was done by these insurers
was found to have been done in "a reasonable market-like fashion." '45
Because of the low level invested in equities and the conservative
method of diversified investing practiced by medical malpractice insur-
ers, the study concluded that this was not the root cause of the poor
position of these companies over the past three years.
The analysis additionally investigated the "Paid Loss Ratio," mea-
sured as a percentage of premium dollars that are paid out to losses. 
146
Between 1975 and 2001, the study found that the average paid loss ratio
was 47%, with a low of 15.9% in 1976 and a ratio of 74.4% in 2001.'47
140. Raghu Ramachandran, Did Investments Affect Medical Malpractice Premiums? INS. INv.
RESEARCH (Brown Brothers Harriman, New York, N.Y.), Jan. 2003.
141. Id. at 2.
142. Id. at 3.
143. Id. at 4.
144. Id. at 3.
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In concrete terms, this means that in 2001 "for every dollar that comes in
the door, 75 cents is paid out." '14 8 Moreover, this figure is exclusive of
other expenses "such as incurred losses, loss adjustment expenses, gen-
eral operating expenses, etc., as well as income from investment." 149 An
outstanding figure calculated when analyzing the data in this way is that
"for the loss ratio to drop to its nadir during [the 1975 to 2001 period],
premiums would have to increase by 368%. ''15 °
While the current paid loss ratio is at an astronomical level, and
premiums would need to increase dramatically to return the industry to
its "nadir," it must be kept in mind that its "nadir" was a ratio of 15.9%.
Therefore, only 15.9% of the turnover generated from premiums was
used to pay claims, which begs the question as to what the companies
were doing with the other 74.1% of premiums collected, and what level
is sustainable to meet other expenses of these companies to operate
profitably.
The Brown Brothers Harriman study reveals that the paid loss ratio
exceeded 50% only twice before 1991, and never dropped below that
level from 1991 to 2001.151 Key questions for legislative policymakers,
therefore, should include: (1) why did the ratio increase so significantly
from 1991 to 2001 when aggregate paid claims stabilized, or even
declined when measured against inflation (see Section IV(A)(2), supra);
(2) at what level of paid loss ratio should insurance companies be
allowed to operate; and (3) what should insurance companies be
required to do with over-capitalized reserves. There is evidence to show
that it was the misuse of excess reserves to boost net profitability during
the first half of the 1990s that not only depleted the reserves but also
sparked intense price competition within the medical malpractice indus-
try with an end result of pushing up the paid loss ratio to its current
untenable level. These claims are examined in the next section.
2. RECENT LOSSES OF PROFITABILITY ARE DUE TO MISMANAGEMENT
A key component to the arguments advanced by opponents of the
current reform measures is that the crisis facing medical malpractice
insurers is largely self-inflicted. There are two major components to this
argument. The first is that insurers over-capitalized their reserves and
irresponsibly "released" these funds to boost their net incomes during
the 1990s. The second part of this argument is that insurers kept premi-
ums low during the 1990s through large gains on investments, and since
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Ramachandran, supra note 140, at 5.
151. Id. at 4.
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the downturn in securities markets, companies have had to institute large
premium increases to overcome investment losses. Both arguments sig-
nal a need to look internally at what insurance companies are doing with
funds provided them in the form of premiums, and call for more strin-
gent regulation of medical malpractice insurers.
In understanding this debate, it is important to keep in mind the
nature of the insurance market. The insurance market in the US is cycli-
cal, with periods of "hard" and "soft" markets. 52 A "hard" market
essentially means that insurers are raising prices for premiums; the cor-
responding "soft" market means that insurance rates are remaining stag-
nant, or flat. Within this terminology, it is telling that "soft" does not
mean that rates are declining; in current-value terms, a period of declin-
ing premiums has rarely, if ever, existed with medical malpractice insur-
ance lines.1 53 Therefore, a descriptive term of art does not exist that
accounts for a period where premiums are actually declining. At pre-
sent, the industry has moved from a soft to a hard market, and there are
many that point to insurance companies themselves for the reasons why
this has happened.' 54
The first claim of insurer irresponsibility has its roots in growing
medical malpractice awards of the 1980s, where actuarial calculations
were reworked to reflect large increases in insurance awards that then
never materialized in the 1990s.155 Using the example of St. Paul,156 the
industry is seen as having set aside too much money for malpractice
claims during the late 1980s, compiling excess reserves that were even-
tually used between 1992 and 1997 to inflate the company's net
income. 57 A note from the company's annual report states the basis for
these changes in accounting practices:
In 1993, The St. Paul adopted the provisions of Statement of Finan-
cial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 113, "Accounting and Report-
152. See Plunkett, supra note 66. See also Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Bush Enters Fray Over
Malpractice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2003, at A24 (quoting Frank A. Sloan, economics professor at
Duke University: "[Medical malpractice] is the most cyclical health policy there is .... There are
periods of time when premiums stop going up, and then nobody's interested, then again we get a
crisis and everyone says juries are terrible.").
153. See Plunkett, supra note 66.
154. National Consumer Groups Applaud Congress' Call for Major Investigation of Insurance
Industry, US NEwswIra, July 3, 2002, available at http://www.usnewswire.com/topnews/first/
0703-119.html (quoting Susanna Montezemolo of the Consumers' Union: "The primary causes of
these crises are severe underwriting problems and the cyclical nature of the medical malpractice
insurance industry. Congress should focus on these issues, rather than ineffective tort 'reform'
efforts.").
155. Zimmerman & Oster, supra note 124, at A8.
156. Id. The company is cited as having a 20% national market share for medical malpractice
insurance during 1985, and is therefore used as the market-leading insurer in this example.
157. Id.
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ing for Reinsurance of Short-Duration and Long-Duration Contracts."
This statement required, among other things, that reinsurance
recoverables on unpaid losses and LAE [loss adjustment expenses] be
shown as an asset, instead of the prior practice of netting this amount
against insurance reserves for balance sheet reporting purposes.' 58
Depleting loss reserves was called "reconciliations" in the notes to the
balance sheets, and resulted in adjustments "totaling $248 million, $328
million and $223 million in 1995, 1994 and 1993, respectively."'
159
Emboldened by the profitability shown by St. Paul, smaller insurers
entered the market during the early part of the 1990s, attracting custom-
ers by undercutting competitors.160 However, the medical malpractice
line of insurance turned out not to be profitable and these companies
learned that "the so-called profitability of he '90s was the result of those
years in the mid-80s when the actuaries were predicting terrible
trends."'
161
The net result was insurers who "knew [medical malpractice pre-
mium] rates were inadequate from 1995 to 2000."' 162 In this way, stiff
competition within the industry developed the soft market of the 1990s,
but insurers' reserves were either irresponsibly funneled out of their
reserves to feed their bottom lines, or were never adequately capitalized
in the first place, leaving insurers poorly positioned to deal with declin-
ing equities markets and a hardening medical malpractice insurance
market after 1999.163
Because of these developments, many critics of malpractice reform
have stated that capping non-economic damages will not achieve the
desired premium savings. In fact, the insurance industry has admitted
that tort reform does not necessarily achieve premium savings for doc-
tors. According to a press release of the American Insurance Associa-
tion, "The insurance industry never promised that tort reform would
achieve specific premium savings."1 65 Further, Donald Zuk, the CEO of
SCPIE Holdings, a California medical malpractice insurer, admitted that
"I don't like to hear insurance-company executives say it's the tort sys-
158. The St. Paul Companies, Inc., 1996 Report JOK-405 to the Securities Exchange
Commission 6 (1996).
159. Id.
160. Zimmerman & Oster, supra note 124.
161. Id. (quoting Donald J. Fager, president of Medical Liability Mutual Insurance Co.).
162. Id. (quoting Bob Sanders, an actuary with Millman USA).
163. Joe Niedzielski, Conning: Upheaval Due in Medical Malpractice, NAT'L UNDERWRTER,
Sept. 15, 1997, at 39. This article claims that as early as 1997, the medical malpractice insurance
industry was predicting poor performance. Favorable loss developments from 1987 to 1993, and
high returns on investments allowed premiums to stay artificially low in comparison to paid
losses, and insurers could remain profitable through investment returns. Id.
164. Kennedy, supra note 96.
165. Id.
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tem - it's self-inflicted."' 66
3. A TALE OF Two INSURERS: ST. PAUL AND FPIC
The poor treatment of loss reserves somewhat complicates the issue
of why medical malpractice insurers have suffered significant losses
over the past three years that now must be recouped through higher pre-
miums charged to policyholders. In addition to loss payments for paid
or defended claims, poor investment performance, strict competition,
and new accounting standards eroded insurers' ability to pay and defend
lawsuits. Statements in the annual reports of two of the largest medical
malpractice insurers during 2000, St. Paul and FPIC, attest to the com-
plexity of assessing the market for medical malpractice insurance.
The St. Paul Companies, Inc.
Between 1996 and 2000, the position of the St. Paul Companies
regarding their Global Healthcare lines of business changed dramati-
cally. Eventually, the company exited the market, claiming that "overall
deterioration in our major accounts results in 2000" caused them to con-
duct "a comprehensive review of our strategic options regarding these
operations."' 167  The deterioration in the company's reserves was
prompted by losses attributed to long-term care and major accounts:
The significant deterioration in underwriting results compared with
1999 was driven by losses incurred in our long-term care and major
accounts books of business, including business acquired in the MMI
purchase. Amounts awarded in jury verdicts against the large entities
served by the major accounts business center increased sharply in
2000, causing us to strengthen previously established loss reserves
for these coverages. 1
68
The situation in 2000 contrasts with the company's position only four
years prior, where favorable loss developments led the company to "rec-
oncile" loss adjustment expense reserves, adding to St. Paul's bottom
line. 169 In their 1996 report to the SEC, the company claimed:
Medical Services has accounted for the majority of favorable prior-
year loss development in each of the last three years. Our conserva-
tive reserving philosophy in this operation is the product of many
years of experience underwriting liability coverages in that unique
and often volatile market .... The medical liability claims environ-
ment in recent years has been relatively favorable, but our response in
terms of reserving has been cautious and gradual, since our prior
166. Id.
167. The St. Paul Companies, Inc., 2000 Annual Report, at 28.
168. Id. at 27.
169. The St. Paul Companies, Inc., 1996 Report IOK-405 to the Securities Exchange
Commission 49 (1996).
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experience with these coverages has shown that reserves previously
believed to be adequate can rapidly revert to a deficiency due to shift-
ing trends in social, legal and regulatory factors. 70
In just four years, the company went from "reconciling" loss
reserves to add to its profitability and touting its conservative prepara-
tion for handling "unique and often volatile market" conditions to a situ-
ation where it began blaming jury verdicts against its insureds and
considering dropping medical malpractice liability coverage altogether.
Indeed, the company did exit the market in 2002, as its loss reserves
ultimately proved inadequate to run the business unit profitably.
1 71
FPIC Insurance Group, Inc.
Contrast the situation of St. Paul with that of FPIC, Florida's larg-
est medical malpractice insurer. 172 Rather than using reserves to add to
their bottom line during the 1990s, the company positioned itself con-
servatively to build a strong customer base that has helped FPIC weather
market changes over the past three years. The company explained:
Specifically, hardening markets have proven favorable for us. It is
essential to maintain adequate pricing, even in a competitive environ-
ment. Over the past several years, we have maintained a more stable
pricing structure than many of our competitors and, as a result, have
been able to maintain our strong policy-holder base. In fact, during
the year, we added more than 3,300 professional liability policyhold-
ers, increased our market share in Florida and Missouri and entered
or grew in other selected markets. Our strong growth fueled an
increase in cash flow, investments and total assets.
173
Because the company did not over-compete on price during the late
1990s, it was better positioned than most of its competitors when facing
hard market conditions, and currently has great opportunity to gain mar-
ket share as its competitors exit the market. 174 Similar to St. Paul, the
company experienced adverse changes in 2000 in terms of increased
closed claims with indemnity payments, slowdown in closure rates for
pending claims, and increased severity of payments.'75 However, the
170. Id. at 49.
171. See The St. Paul Companies, Inc., Annual Report Form JO-K For the Fiscal Year Ended
December 31, 2001, Mar. 29, 2002, at 6.
172. Marie Suszynski, More Than 1,000 Rally in Florida for Federal Med-Mal Bill,
BESTWIRE, July 16, 2002. The company's statewide market share measured by total premiums
collected was estimated at 18.8% in 2001. See also FPIC Insurance Group, Inc., Tough Questions,
Honest Answers: Annual Report for the year 2001, at 48 (57% of the company's malpractice
insurance business consisted of policies written in the state).
173. FPIC Insurance Group, Inc., Tough Questions, Honest Answers: Annual Report for the
year 2001, at 6.
174. Id. at 9.
175. Id. at 63.
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company strengthened reserves to weather these adverse changes rather
than "reconciling" the loss reserves as the St. Paul Companies had
done. 176
Lessons Learned
The complex array of factors that have caused the current "hard"
market for medical malpractice insurance was not given a great deal of
attention by the legislature when deciding how best to deal with the
crisis facing doctors. Factors of insurance company accounting prac-
tices and under pricing over the past decade during the "soft" market
were not adequately dealt with in order to prevent future crises from
eroding the ability of doctors to secure insurance and patients from
obtaining relief for medical negligence. By looking at the past actions
of the insurance companies, it is clear that lowering the value of dam-
ages awarded plaintiffs is not adequate to completely resolve the prob-
lem -of rising malpractice premiums. The legislature should have
ensured greater fiscal responsibility on the part of insurance companies.
4. ALL INSURANCE RATES ARE INCREASING
Yet another factor that the legislature failed to consider is the gen-
eral insurance cycle, which has witnessed increasing premiums on a
number of different commercial lines of business. In 2001, the Council
of Insurance Agents and Brokers identified a number of commercial line
premium increases including: (1) a 21% increase in premiums on small
commercial accounts; (2) a 32% increase in premiums for mid-size com-
mercial accounts; and (3) a 36% increase for premiums on large com-
mercial accounts. 177 The premium growth is seen as a part of the normal
underwriting cycle, where the industry is coming out of the "soft" mar-
ket of the late 1980s and 1990s that was accentuated by stock market
gains and high interest rates, and entering a "hard" market in all com-
mercial lines, not just medical malpractice.'
78
In considering the state of medical malpractice insurance, however,
it is dangerous to point to an insurance cycle across all lines of business
in assessing the effects of rate hikes. It is of little use to claim that
medical malpractice premiums are part of rising premiums globally
throughout the industry, as this does not render premiums more afforda-
ble to either doctors or hospitals. Nonetheless, there is value in looking
across commercial lines when addressing activities of insurance carriers.
It may be that growing premiums are a part of larger price-gouging prac-
tices that unfairly take advantage of the "hard" market but are not justi-
176. See id.
177. Plunkett, supra note 67, at 1-2.
178. Id. at 3.
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fled in terms of losses that have been suffered.1 79 Or, more likely, it
may reflect poor industry-wide decisions in treating investments and
loss reserves, decisions that would naturally be reflected across all lines
of insurance rather than just medical malpractice.1 80 Regardless of the
problematic nature of assessing medical malpractice premiums as
merely a "natural" cycle in the industry, the problem must be assessed in
industry-wide terms, across all lines of business, as malpractice insurers
do not operate in a vacuum, and increasing rates among other commer-
cial lines may indicate larger mismanagement of loss reserves.
B. Too Many Bad Doctors
Yet another factor contributing to high malpractice insurance pre-
miums is that doctors are committing too many negligent errors. Simply
stated, the argument is that the cost of malpractice is due to malpractice
itself, and that any increases in the size or number of malpractice ver-
dicts are the result of negligent practitioners. Discussing this position
necessarily draws upon not only the actions of the doctors themselves,
but also the state Board of Medicine, which is responsible for oversight
of the profession.
Doctor Error
The primary claim is that doctor error kills too many people in the
United States each year. According to an Institute of Medicine report,
between 44,000 and 98,000 people die each year from preventable medi-
cal error, and medical errors cost between $17 billion and $29 billion per
year in lost productivity and excess medical expenses.1 81 Another often-
cited study from Harvard University states that one out of every 200
patients admitted to a hospital dies because of a medical mistake made
by that hospital.1
82
In addition to practitioners who fall below the standard of care,
there are many hospitals that do not adequately deal with infection. The
Center for Disease Control estimated that in 2000, there were 90,000
deaths linked to infections which were contracted within the hospital
itself.18 3 Of this number, the Center estimated that 75,000 were prevent-
179. Id. at 3.
180. Public Citizen, Florida's Real Medical Malpractice Problem: Bad Doctors and Insurance
Companies, Not the Legal System, at 9-10, available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/
FLAreport.pdf (Sept. 2002).
181. LINDA T. KOHN ET AL., To ERR iS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 1-2
(2000).
182. HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL
INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK (1990).
183. Michael J. Berens, Infection Epidemic Carves Deadly Path, CHI. TRIB., July 21, 2002, at
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able by the exercise of sterilization and cleanliness in compliance with
minimum state and federal standards. 184 These numbers are championed
by opponents of further medical malpractice liability reforms as evi-
dence that the quality of care is actually quite low, and that claims for
malpractice are the result of medical errors being committed on patients
rather than patients with "poor outcomes" bringing lawsuits because of
the promise of potentially large jury awards.
185
Even medical practitioners have advocated the position that "reduc-
ing lawsuits requires preventing errors." '186 Dr. Wayne Cohen, who was
the medical director at the Bronx Municipal Hospital, stated that "The
city was spending so much money defending obstetrics suits, they just
made a decision that it would be cheaper to hire people who knew what
they were doing."' 87 Other practitioners have recognized that "there is
more malpractice committed than is recognized, litigated or
compensated."
1 88
While even practitioners see the value of minimizing medical
errors, there are some well-taken criticisms of the studies used to support
the argument that the primary reason for medical malpractice lawsuits is
bad medicine. The first criticism is that the Institute of Medicine's
report was based on evidence gathered in two studies: the higher figure
was taken from the 1990 Harvard Medical Practice study of New York
hospitals while the lower figure was taken from a 1992 study of Colo-
rado and Utah hospitals. 189 These studies, critics argue, were based on
poor outcomes from procedures, not necessarily medical mistakes. 190
Furthermore, a large number of the patients in the survey group in both
studies were "at, or near, the end of their lives."1 9 The argument is that
the results are somewhat suspect given the small patient population, the
institutionalized status of the patients, and the fact that there is no differ-
entiation between medical mistakes amounting to negligence and merely
poor outcomes that were not malpractice.
Whether biased, unscientific, or otherwise, the Institute of
184. Id.
185. Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, Medical Malpractice: Situation Analysis, at 6,
available at http://www.aftl.org.
186. William M. Sage, M.D., Putting the Patient Back in Patient Safety, 287 J. AM. MED.
Ass'N 3003 (2002).
187. Dean Baquet & Jane Fritsch, New York's Public Hospitals Fail, and Babies are the
Victims, N.Y. Tims, Mar. 5, 1995, at 1 (explaining the hospital's decision to use midwives
instead of untrained interns for births).
188. Tort Reform Only Part of Solution for Liability Crisis, AAFP Direct, May 17, 2002, at 1,
available at http://www.aafp.org/ad/afpentireMay-17_ 2002.html.
189. Mark Crane, Medical Mistakes, Must Doctors Take the Rap? Looking Beyond the IOM
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Medicine's report does illustrate the problem of medical errors, some of
which are preventable. In assessing alternative methods of reducing the
weight of malpractice on practicing physicians, then, the legislature
needs to address medical error. Various solutions to the problem of
errors range from advocating more stringent licensure to allowing high
malpractice awards to act as a deterrent to practicing bad medicine.
However, it is clear that many mistakes either are not discovered until it
is too late to bring an action, or never result in a claim. 192 In this envi-
ronment, most consumers look to the Florida Board of Medicine to
guard against poor practitioners.
Poor Oversight
Under Florida law, the Board of Medicine regulates medical practi-
tioners.193 Pursuant to its authority under section 456.079, Florida Stat-
utes, the Board of Medicine promulgates disciplinary guidelines by
which doctors practicing in the state must abide. 194 These provide a
great deal of oversight for physicians and a range of penalties, purport-
edly to deal with the problem of the unsafe practice of medicine by
incompetent physicians. 195 For the purposes of malpractice, there are
several guidelines that the Board has at its disposal to discipline doctors.
It is against these guidelines for a doctor to violate Florida Statute
section 458.33 1(1)(t) and commit "[g]ross or repeated malpractice or the
failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment
which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being
acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances." 196 For a first
offense of this provision, the Board recommends an administrative fine
of between $1,000 and $10,000 plus a penalty of between two years
probation to revocation or denial of the license to practice medicine. 197
For a second offense, the Board recommends suspension, revocation or
192. HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, supra note 182. This book claims that only one in
eight medical errors resulting in death or serious injury ever gives rise to a lawsuit.
193. FLA. STAT. ch. 458.301-458-3.51, 627.357 (2002).
194. The Guidelines are issued by the Board of Medicine in FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 64B8-
8.001 (2004).
195. See FLA. STAT. ch. 458.301 (2002):
The Legislature recognizes that the practice of medicine is potentially dangerous to
the public if conducted by unsafe and incompetent practitioners. The Legislature
finds further that it is difficult for the public to make an informed choice when
selecting a physician and that the consequences of a wrong decision could seriously
harm the public health and safety. The primary legislative purpose in enacting this
chapter is to ensure that every physician practicing in this state meets minimum
requirements for safe practice. It is the legislative intent that physicians who fall
below minimum competency or who otherwise present a danger to the public shall
be prohibited from practicing in this state.
196. See supra note 194.
197. Id.
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denial of licensure, plus an administrative fine of between $5,000 and
$10,000.198
While the Board mandates certain disciplinary action, and the legis-
lature has worded the purpose for instituting a Board of Medicine in the
first place in very strong language, 99 the Board has been criticized for
being too lenient towards infractions. For example, consumer group
Public Citizen states:
The Florida Board of Medicine is dangerously lenient with doctors,
repeatedly letting serious and sometimes repeat offenders off the
hook. . There are many physicians now practicing in Florida who,
had they been practicing in states with more patient-protective medi-
cal boards, would have either lost their licenses to practice or at least
have been given a more serious disciplinary action. Because they are
practicing in Florida, many have escaped with fines or letters of repri-
mand or concern. Most of their patients likely are not aware of their
offenses.Z20
Recidivism
The confluence of too many bad doctors and poor Board of
Medicine oversight has led to a small number of doctors that are respon-
sible for a larger than proportionate share of the malpractice claims both
in Florida and across the United States. In its analysis of data from the
National Practitioner Data Bank ("NPDB"), consumer rights group Pub-
lic Citizen found that there were 2,674 doctors in Florida with more than
one paid claim for medical malpractice.20 Analyzing data provided
since September 1990, the group determined that only 6% of doctors in
the state have paid out multiple claims, but that these multiple payers
have accounted for 47% of the dollar amount paid since the inception of
the NPDB.2 °2
The group's statistics were based on a universe of 44,747 doctors
throughout the state, which contradicts the Bureau of Labor Statistics
("BLS") data. However, even taking the BLS' statistic of 20,980 doc-
tors in Florida during 2000, we see that 12.7% of the state's doctors
accounted for 47% of the total dollar amount paid in claims since
1991.203 This number may creep even higher if we average the number
of doctors operating in the state between September 1991 and the end of
2000, but in no event does the number of doctors with more than one
198. Id.
199. See FLA. STAT. ch. 458.301 (2002).
200. Public Citizen, supra note 180, at 8.
201. Id. at 6.
202. Id.
203. 2000 State Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates, Florida, at http://
www.bls.gov/oes/2000/oes_fl.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
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paid claim total greater than 25% of the practitioners in the state.2°
Information from the Florida Department of Insurance closed
claims database reveals that of the 455 paid claims of over $1 million
since 1975, doctors with multiple paid claims accounted for 58%, or 264
claims.2 °5 Put differently, doctors with one paid claim were 38.1% more
likely to record claims of over $1 million than doctors who had no prior
paid claims.
Anecdotal Information
In addition to data about practitioners who are still allowed to prac-
tice medicine even after scoring multiple paid claims, there are many
anecdotes about poor doctors who are not disciplined by the Florida
Board of Medicine. These "repeat malpractitioners" are well-known in
stories currently circulated by opponents to new measures to protect
doctors. Many of these illustrations purportedly illuminate the mediocre
state of the medical practice in Florida among these habitual violators of
the standard of care.
In the National Practitioner Data Bank, some 23 physicians in Flor-
ida were identified as having paid more than 10 claims.20 6 Only 12 of
these doctors were ever disciplined by the Board of Medicine.20 7 Con-
sumer group Public Citizen has released much anecdotal information
about different recidivist physicians that the Board has failed to disci-
pline, including:
" "Physician Number 98892 settled 18 malpractice lawsuits
between 1991 and 1997 involving improper performance of sur-
gery. The damaged added up to some $2 million. This physician
has never been disciplined."
" "Physician Number 27908 worked in New York State, where he
lost one malpractice suit and settled nine others for a total of $3.7
million. Around 1991, Physician 27908 moved his practice to
Florida, where he settled seven more malpractice suits for a total
of $3.3 million. This doctor, with 17 malpractice lawsuits totaling
$7 million, finally surrendered his New York medical license in
1999, 15 years after the first incident. He still has not been disci-
plined by Florida authorities."
* "Physician 69310 practiced medicine in Indiana, where he accu-
204. An average of the number of doctors practicing in Florida between 1998 and 2000,
according to Bureau of Labor Statistics data, is just under 14,000. As a percentage of this average,
the 2,974 doctors with multiple paid claims represent only 21.2%. See Bureau of Labor Statistics
data, at http://www.bls.gov. Statistics on the number of doctors in Florida prior to 1998 were not
available from the BLS.
205. Florida Department of Insurance, Closed Claims Database, at http://www.fldfs.com/Data/
Liability/index.htm.
206. Public Citizen, supra note 178, at 7.
207. Id.
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mulated eleven lawsuits. Around 1996 he moved to Florida and
settled 4 more, paying some $2 million in damages to injured
patients. This physician has not been disciplined by either Indiana
or Florida authorities. '"2°8
When faced with this anecdotal evidence of large payouts from a
small number of physicians, it is tempting to be taken over by sensation-
alism, claiming that the current crisis is the result of a few bad doctors
who have interrupted the practice for other practitioners. However, these
anecdotes are only illustrative of a small number of doctors in Florida
who have been able to practice negligent medicine with little interven-
tion of the Board of Medicine. Because the new malpractice legislation
has limited the right of patients to sue negligent doctors, it should have
provided for greater oversight of the way that the Board of Medicine's
applies its disciplinary standards. This is yet another shortcoming of
Senate Bill 2-D passed in August, 2003.
C. Managed Care Has Changed the Health Care Industry
A final factor that the legislature failed to consider when enacting
the new legislation is changes in the health care industry in general. In
this respect, the largest change is the business aspect of practicing
medicine, which increasingly necessitates navigating the managed care
system. Because of the high cost of medical care, managed care is a
"necessary evil" that has developed as consumers look for ways to cut
their expenditures.20 9 Between 1980 and 2000, increases in the cost of
medical care has outpaced increases in the consumer price index in gen-
eral, with the exception of 1980 when the CPI for all good grew by
13.5% compared to 11% growth in the CPI for medical care.210 In this
environment, consumers have traded traditional health insurance policies
for managed care of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and
Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs).
Managed care has brought several changes to the way that doctors
do business. First, managed care requires primary care physicians to act
as gate-keepers limiting access to higher-cost specialists within organi-
211zations. With doctors increasingly pressured not to refer patients to
specialists, many opponents of the managed care system have argued
208. Id.
209. Dan Lonkevich, Medical Malpractice Reform Inches Ahead, NAT'L UNDERWRITER -
LiFE & HEALTH, Nov. 10, 1997, at 32.
210. United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index
series (1982-84 = 100.0), available at http://www.bls.gov.
211. David M. Katz, Health Care Growth Spawns New Risks, NAT'L UNDERWRITER - LrFE &
HEALTH, Nov. 10, 1997, at 49.
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that doctors are at an increased risk for missing diagnoses. 2  Doctors
themselves have recognized these pressures and often have complained
that the system of managed care is reducing the overall quality of medi-
cal care throughout the country. 13
The increased role of managed care is a response to the very real
problem of increasing health care costs throughout the country.
Between 1980 and 2001, private health care expenditures increased by
578.8% to a projected level of $1.4 trillion, representing compound
annual growth of 8.72%.214 While it is not unreasonable for managed
care to have stepped in to respond to this ballooning of medical costs,
one way in which they have attempted to keep costs down is by limiting
remuneration for doctors such that practitioners are no longer able to
pass increased medical malpractice premiums on to consumers.21 5
The unfortunate result of an inability to pass on malpractice pre-
mium costs is illustrated by the small percentage of total health care
costs attributed to premiums. As a ratio of just private health care
expenditures during 2000, malpractice premiums amounted to only
0.56% of health care costs. 216 As a function of total health care costs,
therefore, the cost of malpractice insurance declined from nearly 1% in
1988 to 0.56% in 2000. However, it has been recognized that large pre-
mium growth over the past two years has pushed this level back to
around the 1% range.
217
212. Id.
213. See Lonkevich, supra note 209, at 32.
214. U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2002, at 91.
215. See supra note 79.
216. See Plunkett, supra note 67, at Exhibit B. Accord Insurance Information Institute, Hot
Topics and Insurance Issues: Medical Malpractice, Jan. 2003, available at http://www.iii.org/
media/hottopics/insurance/medicalmat/content.print/findings ("Medical malpractice premiums
contribute about 1 percent to the overall cost of health care").
217. Id. at Appendix B.
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Medical Malpractice Premiums as a Percentage of Health Care Expenditures
2 18
US$, million
Total Malpractice Private Health Care Premiums as a %
Year Premiums Earned Expenditures of Total Expenditures
1988 5,322 562,000 0.95
1989 5,379 623,900 0.86
1990 5,157 699,400 0.74
1991 5,015 766,800 0.65
1992 5,127 836,500 0.61
1993 5,367 898,500 0.60
1994 5,896 947,700 0.62
1995 6,207 993,700 0.66
1996 6,190 1,042,500 0.59
1997 6,402 1,092,400 0.59
1998 6,559 1,146,000 0.57
1999 6,703 1,211,000 0.55
2000 7,360 1,311,000 0.56
Even if costs have approached the 1% range by 2003, it would
appear that allowing these costs to be passed to the consumer in
exchange for adequate judicial protection from adverse medical error
would not significantly add to the enormous cost of health care paid by
consumers. Certainly, the one percent cost savings to consumers could
have been realized in some way other than curbing injured patients'
access to the courts. The legislature failed to assess whether there really
was no alternative to achieving this savings 219 in areas such as adminis-
trative costs, systems efficiencies, or other cost cutting that could rea-
sonably be implemented throughout the health care industry.
VII. CONCLUSION
In examining the findings of fact upon which the legislature based
Senate Bill 2-D, as well as the factors leading to higher malpractice pre-
miums that were omitted in these findings, it is clear that there were
certainly alternative methods of ensuring access to medical care in the
state of Florida. In terms of reducing malpractice premiums paid by
doctors, there is significant evidence that the measures passed will not
result in premium savings, and that insurance reform measures not
enacted could have achieved the same result. Because of these short-
comings, there is a good likelihood that constitutional challenge to the
measures passed in Senate Bill 2-D will be successful.
There are a variety of factors that have led to the current "hard"
insurance market facing doctors. Not only are large patient awards to
blame, but also stiff competition during the past decade among insurers
218. See Plunkett, supra note 67, at 3.
219. See Smith v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1088 (Fla. 1987). For a discussion of the
constitutional standard of restricting access to the courts by capping non-economic damages, see
Section V(B) of this Comment.
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in all lines of business, poor medical care and lax oversight by the Board
of Medicine, and the changing face of medical care as managed care
companies attempt to control the high cost of medical services. Many of
these factors were not dealt with by Senate Bill 2-D. Instead, the legis-
lature focused on only one aspect of the problem: large damage awards.
This Comment has attempted to show why the present cap on non-eco-
nomic damages that resulted from this narrow focus is probably the least
appropriate method for dealing with the problem of skyrocketing mal-
practice insurance premiums.
Certain large questions have not yet been addressed by the legisla-
ture. For example, there were no provisions for how insurance compa-
nies account for the premiums that they collect. Taking a cross-section
of data from this report, we see that summing up FPIC's market share in
Florida for 2001 by its collected premiums yields a figure of $570.7
million in total written premiums throughout the state.220 For the same
year, the highest estimated total value of paid claims was $239.2 mil-
lion, from 958 total claims.221 If we divide this figure by the highest
estimated percentage of how many filed claims never result in plaintiff
payments (70%), we arrive at an estimated 3,193 malpractice claims for
the year 2001. If each of these claims is then multiplied by the average
cost of defending a claim, $24,669, and add the result to the value of
paid claims, the total spending on defending and paying claims in Flor-
ida for 2001 was $317.98 million.
In this estimation, we can see that some $252.7 million, or 44.3%
of all premiums collected by insurance companies, were not used for
either paying or defending claims. Put into per-doctor terms, the total
written premiums divided by 20,980 doctors yields an average of
$27,201 on written premiums. Of this value, $15,156 per doctor is
applied to defending current claims and paying closed claims. This
leaves a residual value of $12,045 from the monies collected from these
doctors.
Certainly, there should have been some accountability for how
these monies were applied to administrative costs, loss reserving, and
other uses by insurance companies. It was irresponsible of the legisla-
ture to pass measures that limited victims' recovery for malpractice
without having passed measures to ensure that loss reserves were not
squandered by high administrative fees, poor investment choices, or
"reconciliations" that add to insurance companies' net profitability with-
out holding monies in reserve to pay future claimants.
220. This figure accords with a sum of written premiums gathered by the Governor's Task
Force. See Hrrr ET At., supra note 64, at 62-63.
221. Id.
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Presented with a good opportunity to pass more comprehensive
changes to the way the entire industry operates with regards to medical
malpractice insurance, the legislature fell short. It took away part of a
malpractice victim's right to recover for damages from negligent medi-
cal care, and provided no proven method to guarantee that Florida con-
sumers would receive better treatment. Capping non-economic damages
does have certain broad economic benefits to doctors and insurers by
limiting exposure and ensuring more stable risk environments. However,
to take advantage of these benefits, insurance companies should be pres-
sured to transparently account for how their written premiums are spent,
and doctors should be pressured to account for the level of care they
provide. At the same time, some attention should be given to why doc-
tors cannot pass through the cost of higher malpractice premiums to con-
sumers, possibly adjusting the way that managed care companies do
business in Florida. Ultimately, the courts will be left to determine
whether the benefits to doctors and insurers are sufficient to justify the
detriment to consumers and that there is no other way to achieve relief
for doctors from high malpractice premiums than partially closing the
courts to victims of medical negligence.
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